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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper shows that the optimal environmental tax should be less than the marginal environmental 
damages; since the presence of pre-existing distortionary taxes, increasing the welfare costs is associated 
with the overall tax code. The reduction of pollution causes the benefits of health by supplying maximum 
labors to create benefit-side tax interactions, which will tend to reduce the optimal environmental taxes. The 
paper also shows that the existence of social security system preserves the gross wage of labors during sick 
days and grants subsidies to medical treatments. An attempt is made to confirm that health effects labor 
supply, which results in an additional impact, the benefit-side tax-interaction effect.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the recent years the populations of the world is growing rapidly. Larger parts of this population are living 
in the South Asia. China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia and some other countries of the 
South Asia are densely populated. For the daily needs of residence and cultivation human is continually 
destroying forests and wetlands. On the other hand, various industries are growing rapidly in every country 
of the world for the demand of the large population. As a result, the environmental pollution is increasing 
which effects on human health. 
 
Tullock (1967) and Terkla (1984) were the first who suggested that revenues from environmental taxation 
could be used to finance reductions in pre-existing taxes. We see that this fund recycling process would 
significantly reduce the welfare costs associated with the overall tax code. However, it did not account for the 
effects of health damages from pollution. The paper of Schwartz and Repetto (2000) suggested that such 
health effects may cause the optimal environmental tax to exceed the marginal damage from pollution. The 
revenue got from environmental taxation was used to reduce taxation of labor; it would reduce the distortion 
in the labor market. Hence, it would be used to reduce the deadweight loss associated with income taxes. As 
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a result, the double dividend hypothesis implies that the optimal environmental tax generally exceeds 
marginal damages when revenues are used in this way. We show as like Williams (2003) and Caffet (2005) 
that this is not the case. The papers of 1990s, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg 
(1994, 1996), Parry (1995), Goulder (1995), Goulder; Parry; Williams III, and Burtraw (1999), and other 
authors have demonstrated that the existence of an offsetting tax-interaction effect. Pollution taxes drive up 
the price of consumption goods, so that lower the real wage, causing households to work less and consume 
more leisure which raise the environmental taxes.  
 
We see that in the papers of 1990s have cited above suggested that the ability to simultaneously curb 
pollution and tax distortions are much more limited than previously thought. They emphasized on the 
second-best negative impacts of pollution taxes. Fullerton and West (2010), Islam; Mohajan and Paul (2011) 
have discussed the taxes on cars and gasoline. They have shown that if government is applied a tax for 
engine size and gasoline, and the motorists obey the rules accordingly then environment pollution must be 
decreased. Blundell and Shephard (2011) recently have analyzed in detail about optimal taxation of low-
income families, which will be beneficial to the family and to the government. Bossi; Calcott and Petkov 
(2011) have studied the implementation of the social optimum in a model of habit formation. They have 
considered taxes that address inefficiencies due to negative consumption externalities, imperfect competition, 
and self-control problems. David and Sinclair-Desgagn´e (2010) and Hattori (2011) characterized optimal 
environmental policy in a case where innovation in clean production technologies is developed and provided 
by a monopoly. Fullerton (2011) has used the example of a proposed carbon permit system to illustrate and 
has discussed six different types of distributional effects. Himmes and Weber (2011) analyzed the optimal 
policy design in a context with more than one externality while taking explicitly into account uncertainty 
surrounding future emission damage costs. Kaplow (2011) has given the technique to illuminate and has 
extended Tax by Design’s analysis regarding the VAT, environmental taxation, wealth transfer taxation, and 
income transfers. Mohajan, Deb and Chakraborty (2011) show that due to environment pollution workers 
suffer from illness; as a result economic development decreases. Ploeg  and  Withagen  (2010, 2011a,b) have 
analyzed the optimal time of transition from fossil fuel to renewable, amount of fossil fuel to leave in situ, 
and carbon tax. Ulph and Ulph (2011) have discussed the optimal design of climate change policies when a 
government wants to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in 
developing cleaner technologies, but the relevant carbon taxes or other environmental policies that would 
incentives such investment by firms will be set in the future.  
 
In this paper we analysis the effect of health from environment pollution in the light of the above mention 
papers. The model confirms that health effects labor supply, which results in an additional impact, the 
benefit-side tax-interaction effect.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section-2, we discuss the mathematical model of environmental tax.  
This is used to discuss the beneficial side of environmental tax in section-3 and optimal environmental tax in 
section-4. Final section-5 is of concluding remarks. Derivation of equations (16) and (17) are given in 
appendices. 
 
2   THE MODEL 
 
Let us consider a representative agent. The households divide the endowment time T between leisure l and 
labor L, hence we can write; 
 
                                                                   T = l +L.                                                                                 (1) 
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At the time T the agent produce the two consumption goods X and Y, where X is polluted good but Y is clean 
good. Now the maximized utility function U of the households can be written as (Williams 2003 and Caffet 
2005): 
 
                                                            ( )GHlYXUU ,,,,=                                                             (2) 
 
which is continuous and quasi-concave. Here H is the consumer health, and G is the quality of a public good. 
 
The health situation of consumer is a function of both environmental quality Q and medical expenditure M, 
so that; 
 
        ( )QMHH ,= .                                                                 (3) 
 
By the practical experience it can be written as; 
   
, and 02
2
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In the model as like Caffet (2005) we have considered consumption equals production, so that they are 
equivalent. Good X is dirty, cause a negative externality, either in consumption or in production but good Y is 
clean and hence no such externality. Consumption of polluted good X has two effects: 
 
• X diminishes the consumer welfare by deteriorating his health condition. 
 
• X causes households to lose some period to sickness. 
 
For taking polluted good households lose some period to sickness. As a result their endowment time T will be 
reduced so that they lose their total allocated time for work or leisure or for both i.e., they face a household 
time constraint as follows: 
 
                  L + l < T.                                                                     (4) 
 
Williams (2003) has considered the sickness S is a function of environmental quality Q, i.e., 
 
S = S (Q), 
 
But Caffet (2005) has considered that the sick days are not excessively a function of environmental quality 
but more generally of the agent’s health condition i.e.,  
 
S = S (H),  with 0<∂
∂
H
S
.                                                           (5) 
 
We see that Caffet’s assumption is more realistic, since it will allow us to better approach interactions 
between subsidies to medical expenditures and environmental taxation. By this assumption the household 
time constraint can be written as; 
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         ( )HSTlL −=+ .                                                           (6) 
 
To normalize as like Caffet (2005) we consider for pollution and consumption of one unit of the polluting 
good X emits one unit of pollution. Hence, an exogenous baseline level of environmental quality Q  will be 
related with environmental quality Q as follows: 
 
              XQQ −= .                                                                 (7) 
 
Again X, Y, G and M are all produced using labor as the only factor of production, so that all of them are 
considered as goods. In the model units are normalized such that one unit of labor can produce one unit of 
any of the four goods, hence;  
 
                 ( ) HGYXLLf +++== .                                              (8) 
 
The government or social security system imposes a tax Xτ  on good X, and also include a tax on labor 
income Lτ . The government or social security system preserves the gross wage during sick-days, and grants 
subsidies to medical expenditures. In the model as like Caffet (2005) we assume a global subvention rate 
Mτ . For simplicity we also normalize the gross wage to equal one, and then the consumer budget constraint 
can be written as follows: 
 
                                     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )MYXISL MXL  1 1 1 τττ −+++=++−                                (9) 
 
Where I is lump-sum income, which is assumed to be zero. In the budget constraint we always include I, 
even though households do not have any lump-sum income, in order to provide a strong expression for 
income effects. 
 
For simplicity we assume that the tax revenue is used to provide a fixed quantity of the public good; 
 
                           XLG XL ττ += .                                                      (10) 
  
Government income is the sum of labor and pollution tax revenues, hence it can be written as follows: 
 
                                               ( ) SMGXSL MXL ++=++ τττ .                                                 (11) 
 
The household maximum utility (2) subject to their time (6) and budget constraints (9), taking the quantity of 
the public good (10), the tax rates and the level of environmental quality as given. Incorporating all the 
information mentioned above and after some simplification, we can write the maximum utility function (2) as 
follows: 
 
                             ( ) ( ) ( )( )MlXYCU MLX  1 1 1 τττλ −+−++++=                                 (12) 
 
Where λ is the marginal utility of income and C is for constant terms. 
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Applying the first order partial differentiation of (12) for maximization, we obtain:  
 
                                                                 λ=∂
∂
Y
U
,                                                    (13a) 
  
                                                                 ( )XX
U τλ +=∂
∂ 1 ,                                 (13b) 
 
       ( )Ll
U τλ −=∂
∂ 1 ,                                 (13c)         
       ( )
H
M
H
U
M ∂
∂−=∂
∂ τλ 1 .                                             (13d) 
 
 
These first order conditions, together with other equations given so far implicitly define the uncompensated 
demand functions as follows: 
 ( )IQX MLX ,,,, τττ ;    Y ( )IQMLX ,,,, τττ ;    ( )IQl MLX ,,,, τττ ;   ( )IQM MLX ,,,, τττ  
 
 
3   BENEFICIAL SIDES OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAX 
 
In this section, we will examine the impacts of welfare for imposing environmental tax. First, we define key-
parameter following Bovenberg (1999), Williams (2003) and Caffet (2005) as follows: 
    
            ( ) 1+∂
∂−+
∂
∂
=
L
L
L
L
lHSL
l
ττ
ττη                                               (14) 
 
This is the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF), the cost to the household of raising a marginal dollar of 
government revenue through the labor tax. The denominator of (14) is the marginal tax revenue for an 
incremental increase in the labor tax rate, Lτ  which can be obtained by differentiating the term ( )SLL +τ . 
The numerator of (14) is the welfare loss from an incremental increase in Lτ which is the wedge between the 
gross wage and the net wage, and multiplied by the reduction in labor supply. Practical experience suggests 
that while male labor supply may be backward bending, that is estimates of the male labor-supply elasticity 
are close to zero, female labor-supply elasticity estimates are much higher and thus total labor supply is 
definitely not backward bending (Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba 1998). Here gross wage equals to the value 
marginal product of labor and the net wage equals to the marginal social cost of labor in terms of foregone 
labor. The first term of (14) is the marginal deadweight loss per dollar of revenue. The cost to households is 
the deadweight loss plus the revenue, so that MCPF equals first term plus one. This is a partial equilibrium 
definition of the MCPF, since it ignores all effects outside the labor market, including changes in the 
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deadweight loss in the market for good X, environmental quality and the revenue from the corrective tax. The 
marginal revenue from the labor tax is positive so that from (14) we see that η > 1.  
 
Williams (2003) defines marginal damages from pollution Pτ  as the sum of two terms, the respective values 
of the direct utility loss from reduced health and the time lost to illness where the gross wage has been 
normalized to equal one, as follows: 
 
    
Q
H
H
S
Q
H
H
U
P ∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂
∂
∂= λτ
1
. 
 
Since the representative agent still earns his wage during sick-days, so that Caffet (2005) corrected the 
second term of it. Caffet’s logic is that households only bear the distortionary cost introduced by the 
government transfers, which is the marginal deadweight loss of the labor tax relative to the wage keeping 
device. In this way, the Pigovian rate is given by: 
 
         ( )
Q
H
H
S
Q
H
H
U
P ∂
∂
∂
∂−−∂
∂
∂
∂= 11 ηλτ .                                (15) 
 
With the basis of (15), the welfare effect of the environmental tax being as follows (for derivation see 
Appendix-I): 
    ( ) ( )
444444 3444444 21444 3444 214434421
IRP dW
X
M
X
L
dW
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X
dW
X
PX
X d
dM
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H
Sl
d
dXX
d
dX
d
dU ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂++∂
∂−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−= ττττηττηττττλ  1
1
 
        
                                                       
4444 34444 21
IBdW
X
L d
dQ
Q
l
Q
H
H
S
τητ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂−                                                     (16) 
 
The 1st term of (16) is the primary or Pigovian effect,  which is the effect of the tax on the pollution 
externality. In a first-best world without pre-existing distortions, the optimum is reached for
PdW
PX ττ = , which 
means that the optimal environmental tax must equal to the Pigovian rate. 
 
The 2nd term is the gain from the marginal revenue-recycling effect, , which is the welfare gain from 
using the pollution tax revenues to reduce the labor tax. This is happen when they are returned lump-sum and 
have no efficiency consequences at all. So that  is the product of the efficiency value per dollar of 
revenue and the incremental pollution tax revenue, where the marginal excess burden of taxation.  
RdW
RdW
 
The 3rd term  and 4IdW th term  are respectively what Williams (2003) called cost-side and benefit-
side tax interaction effects. They activate when changes in households’ labor supply decisions interact with 
the labor market distortion. 
IBdW
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For the 3rd term, the pollution tax drives up the price of consumer polluting goods, which lower the real wage 
and as a result it affects discouraging labor supply. We have seen that this fall in labor supply must 
exacerbate the private social cost of the labor tax by 
X
L
l
ττ ∂
∂
 (Caffet 2005). The beneficial side is that this 
also reduces labor tax revenues equal to 
X
L
l
ττ ∂
∂
 and  thus requiring a compensating increase in the labor 
tax rate and creating an efficiency loss which equals to the amount that the government has to refund 
multiplied by the efficiency cost per dollar of labor tax revenue, that is, the marginal excess burden of labor 
taxation. The tax interaction effect identified by prior literature on the double dividend hypothesis is 
exclusively the welfare loss from these two impacts, which equals to 
X
L
l
τητ ∂
∂
. In the analysis of Caffet 
(2005), there is however a second term in . In this term, first part indicates medical expenditures 
generate an efficiency gain, ( )
IdW
X
M
X
ττη ∂
∂−  1  which is related to the contraction of subsidies’ amount. 
Second part indicates subventions cause this consumption to be under priced relative to its social cost. As a 
result, any decrease in medical expenditures will lead to a general-equilibrium welfare gain. This gain equals 
the wedge between supply and demand prices multiplied by the reduction of subsidized consumption, which 
is equals to
X
X
τ
IB
Mτ ∂
∂
.  
 
The 4th term  is the benefit-side tax interaction effects, which expresses the impact of improved 
environmental quality on labor supply decisions. Caffet’s logic is that a rise in sick-days does not imply a 
decrease in government revenues. Because 
dW
Lτ  is levied on L +S instead of effective labor income L. So that 
welfare impacts of sick-days reduction can be resumed by the product of that decrease and the sum of the 
efficiency gain and the private social benefit relative to that decrease. 
 
4   OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAX 
 
Following Williams (2003), we now stress on the two opposite tax interaction effects,  and . 
Following Caffet (2005) we also consider the neutral assumption that goods X and Y  are equal substitutes for 
leisure, allowing equation (16) to be re-written as follows (for derivation see APPENDIX-II); 
IdW dW IB
 
  ( ) ⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂
∂
∂−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂+−−=
Q
H
H
S
d
dM
M
H
H
S
d
dX
d
dU
X
M
X
PX
X ττηττηττλ
1
    
                              ( ) ( ) ( )
X
MM
L
LI
d
dQ
Q
M
I
M
τττη ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫∂
∂−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−∈
∈−−
−
1111
1
                      (17) 
 
Where  ∈  is the uncompensated labor supply elasticity and  L LI∈  is the income elasticity of labor supply. 
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The first term on the right hand side combines the primary welfare effect, the first component of cost-side tax 
interaction effect and the revenue-recycling effect. Without the other terms on the right hand side, it indicates 
that the optimal environmental tax is equal to the Pigovian rate divided by the MCPF. The second term 
symbolizes the interactions have already identified between subsidies to medical expenditures and 
environmental taxation. Finally, the last term shows that benefit-side tax interaction effects must improved 
health conditions, may significantly reduce the gross cost of an environmental tax reform.  
 
Health effects might lead to a double dividend if an environmental tax on both reduces pollution and raise 
welfare, which is exclusive of the environmental benefits (Goulder 1995). If the second dividend is defined 
as a welfare gain exclusive of both direct and indirect benefits of reduction pollution, then excluding both the 
primary effect and the benefit-side tax-interaction effect, the introducing health effects will not produce a 
double dividend. Even if double dividend only deals with an additional hypothesis, we have tried to show 
that it is a crucial point in studies modeling health effects in the agent’s utility function (Caffet 2005). By 
introducing labor market imperfections in models which deal with the possibility of finding labor market 
imperfections in models which deal with the possibility of obtaining a second dividend in the form of a 
reduced unemployment level. This assumes the existence of a social security system seems that it is 
necessary to correctly estimate double dividend prospects in explicitly modeling health studies (Bovenberg 
and Van der Ploeg 1994, Caffet 2005).  
 
Williams (2003) used typical parameters, a labor tax Lτ = 0.4, an uncompensated labor supply elasticity L∈ = 
0.15 and an income elasticity of labor supply 15.0−=∈LI  and obtained the last term of his equation (11) is 
actually negative. In the model of Caffet (2005) and in our model for the same typical parameters, the sign of 
benefit-side tax interaction effects is undetermined, since the term 
Q
H
H
S
∂
∂
∂
∂−  is positive, which represents 
the welfare gain due to the reduction of social transfer relative to the wage-keeping device. 
 
Finally we can say with Caffet (2005) that if the negative income effect due to the reduction of transfers S(H) 
is superior to the positive income effect due to the reduction of medical expenditures, then the substitution of 
S(H) by L implies that the optimal environmental tax rate is greater than traditionally highlighted by the 
models of Bovenberg (1999);   Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Bovenberg 
and Ploeg (1994; 1996), Parry (1995), Goulder (1995), Goulder; Parry; Williams III, and Burtraw.(1999), 
Blundell and Shephard (2011), Bossi ;Calcott and Petkov (2011), David and Sinclair-Desgagn´e (2010), 
Fullerton and West (2010), Fullerton (2011), Hattori (2011), Himmes and Weber (2011), Kaplow(2011), and 
Ploeg and  Withagen (2010, 2011a,b). 
 
5   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper shows that optimal environmental tax rate might exceed marginal damages. Bovenberg (1999);   
Bovenberg and Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Bovenberg and Ploeg (1994), Parry (1995), 
Goulder (1995) or Goulder; Parry; Williams III, and Burtraw (1999) have analyzed the double dividend 
hypothesis. Schwartz and Repetto (2000) suggest that health damages from pollution may cause the optimal 
environmental tax to exceed the marginal damage from pollution. But we show that actually this is not the 
case. The social security system tends to magnify benefit-side tax interactions, which could finally offset cost 
side ones. This paper is prepared mainly following Caffet (2005) and Williams (2003). We have tried to give 
mathematical calculations and physical interpretations in some details. Derivation of equations (16) and (17) 
are given in Appendix with detail calculations thinking for the readers who are new in this field. We hope 
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that the readers will feel no bother when study this paper and realize the importance of the optimal 
environmental taxes due to health effects. 
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APPENDIX-I 
 
 
Derivation of equation (16): 
 
Taking the total derivative of utility (12) with respect to the corrective tax Xτ , substituting the consumer 
first-order conditions (13), and for constant public spending ( 0=dG ),  and finally dividing both sides by  λ 
we obtain as follows:  
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     ( ) ( ) ( )
XX
M
X
L
X
X
XX d
dQ
Q
H
H
U
d
dM
d
dl
d
dX
d
dY
d
dU
τλττττττττλ ∂
∂
∂
∂+−+−+++= 11111 .         (AI-1) 
 
Taking a total derivative of the production function (8) with respect to Xτ  gives;  
                             
                             
XXXXX d
dM
d
dG
d
dX
d
dY
d
dL
τττττ +++= .                                              (AI-2) 
 
Again taking the total derivative of the household time constraint (6) we obtain; 
 
                  ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂−=+
XXXXX d
dQ
Q
H
d
dM
M
H
H
S
d
dT
d
dl
d
dL
τττττ .                                               (AI-3) 
 
Further consider the household’s time endowment T and the public good G  be constant, so that using  
 and , then from (AI-2) and (AI-3) we get: 0= 0=dTdG
 
                       
XXXX d
dM
d
dX
d
dY
d
dL
ττττ ++= ,                                   (AI-4) 
 
 
                 ⎟⎟⎠
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∂
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∂−=+
XXXX d
dQ
Q
H
d
dM
M
H
H
S
d
dl
d
dL
ττττ .                                              (AI-5) 
 
 
From (AI-4) and (AI-5) takes we can write; 
 
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛
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∂
∂
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XXX d
dQ
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H
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S
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dl
τττ          XXX d
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d
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d
dY
τττ ++ + .                                   (AI-6) 
 
Using (AI-6) in (AI-1) can be written as; 
 
 
⎟⎟⎠
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⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂−∂
∂
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X
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X d
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S
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11
.(AI-7) 
 
From (15) we obtain; 
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                                     ( )
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H
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S
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∂−+ λητ
11 .                                     (AI-8) 
 
Using (AI-8) in (AI-7) can be written as follows: 
 
( ) .11 ⎟⎟⎠
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⎛
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                            (AI-9) 
 
Using   only in second term of right hand side of (AI-9) we get; dXdQ −=
 
( ) ( )
X
M
X
L
XX
PX
X d
dM
M
H
H
S
d
dl
d
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S
d
dX
d
dU
τττττηττττλ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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∂
∂
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∂
∂
∂−+−= 21 .                (AI-10) 
 
We now take steps to make the term 
Xd
dl
τ  more explicit. This term symbolizes interactions between the 
environmental tax and household labor supply decisions. According to the uncompensated demand equations 
and since the government adjusts its budget constraint with  Lτ  (i.e., 0=
X
L
d
d
τ
τ
),  we can write it as follows: 
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LXX d
dQ
Q
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dll
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∂= .                                (AI-11) 
 
Taking the total derivative of (9) we get; 
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Taking the total derivative of (11) we obtain; 
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Using (AI-12) in (AI-13) yield: 
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                                                                                                                          (AI-14) 
 
This expression gives the reduction in labor tax that can be financed by a marginal increase in the 
environmental tax, while maintaining budget balance. 
 
Using (AI-14) in (AI-11) we find: 
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From (14) we can write; 
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then (AI-15) becomes; 
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Using (AI-16) in (AI-10) the equation (AI-17) becomes as follows: 
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L d
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S
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∂+∂
∂
∂
∂−  .                                                                (AI-17) 
 
This is the required equation (16). 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX-II 
 
 
Derivation of equation (17): 
 
Assume that utility, the levels of public spending and environmental quality be constant. Now taking the total 
derivative of utility (12) with respect to Lτ  we get; 
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−
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+=
11
1
11
1
11
1
,                                     (AII-1) 
 
where ‘c’ denotes a compensated derivative. 
 
The assumption that the cross elasticity of X and leisure is equal to the average (weighted by assumption 
shares) over all goods is given by: 
 
 
                              IMMIYYIXXIX SSS ,,,, ∈+∈+∈=∈ ,                                              (AII-2) 
 
where ( ) i
i
L
C
Ii
τ
τ
−
−∂
∂=∈ 1
1,
L    and   ( )∑= ip
ips
i
i
i  respectively represent the compensated elasticity of 
demand for good i with respect to the price of leisure and share of that good i in total consumption. Here i = 
X, Y,  M. 
 
Now (AII-2) can be written as follows: 
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                                     (AII-3) 
ubstituting (AII-3) and the household budget constraint (9) in (AII-1) after some manipulation gives; 
                                  
 
  
 
S
 
       ( ) X
SLXl
L
c
L
c +
−∂
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∂
ττ 1 .                                                                           (AII-4)     
 
ince the change in the price of good X is equal to the change in the tax rate, the Slutsky equations give: 
                                  
S
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I
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X
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X ∂
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∂=∂
∂
ττ ,                                                (AII-5)    
                                                            
                            ( )SL
I
lll c ∂∂∂
LL
+∂−∂=∂ ττ .                                              (AII-6)     
 
sing (AII-4) in (AII-6) can be written as; 
                                  
U
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1 ττ .                              (AII-6a)     
 
he expression for the (cost-side) tax interaction effect from equation (16) becomes; 
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ng (AII-5) in (AII-7) we get; Usi
 
             ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−∂
∂−=
X
M
X
c
L
I
d
dM
M
H
H
SX
I
lldW ττττη . `                                           (AII-8) 
 
gain the Slutsky symmetry property is as follows: 
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sing (AII-9) and (AII-6a) in (AII-8) can be expressed as; 
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rom (16) the benefit-side tax interaction effects  is: 
                
F IBdW
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y the partial derivative of the household budget constraint (9), the change in spending on X, Y and l for a 
)
B
change in Q becomes as follows: 
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∂ ττ 11 .                                          (AII-12)  
 
imilarly as like (AII-12) for the change in I, (9) becomes: 
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S
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∂− τττ 1111 .                             (AII-13) 
eak separability of the health in the utility function implies that leisure demand is determined only by the 
hose relative prices are not affected by changes in Q or changes in I. As a result, the derivative of l with 
             
 
W
relative prices of l, X and Y, and by total spending on those goods. 
 
T
respect to Q will equal the derivative of l with respect to I times the ratio of the derivative of spending on 
those goods with respect to Q (AII-12) to the derivative of spending on those goods with respect to I (AII-
13). Hence (AII-13) becomes; 
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.                                                    (AII-14) 
 
gain the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is; A
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and the income elasticity of labor supply is; 
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Dividing (AII-16) by (AII-15) we get; 
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Multiplying (AII-14) by Lητ and using (AII-17) we get; 
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Now using (AII-18) in (AII-11) we find that; 
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Finally using the value of dW  and  from (AII-10) and (AII-18) in (16) we get; I IBdW
 
( ) ( ) ( )
X
M
X
X
X
PX
X d
dM
M
H
H
SX
d
dXX
d
dX
d
dU
ττηηττηττττλ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂+−−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−+−= 1 11                                       
                              
                        + ( ) ( ) ( )
X
MM
L
LI
d
dQ
Q
M
I
M
Q
H
H
S
τττη ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
∂
∂−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−∈
∈−−∂
∂
∂
∂−
−
1111
1
,      
  
( ) ⎩⎨
⎧
∂
∂
∂
∂−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
∂
∂+−−=
Q
H
H
S
d
dM
M
H
H
S
d
dX
d
dU
X
M
X
PX
X ττηττηττλ
1
                                           
                            
KASBIT Business Journal, 4:1-19 (2011)                                                                        http://www.kasbit.edu.pk/journal/index.htm                         
 
Optimal Environmental Taxes Due to Health Effect                                    By Haradhan Kumar Mohajan 
 
19
                           ( ) ( ) ( )
X
MM
L
LI
d
dQ
Q
M
I
M
τττη ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫∂
∂−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−−∈
∈−−
−
1111
1
.                                (AII-20)                            
 
This is the required equation (17). 
